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Abstract 
The demand for privacy of digital data and of algorithms for handling more complex structures have increased 
exponentially over the last decade. However, the critical problem arises when there is a requirement for publicly 
computing with private data or to modify functions or algorithms in such a way that they are still executable 
while their privacy is ensured. This is where homomorphic cryptosystems can be used since these systems 
enable computations  with encrypted data. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme enables computation of 
arbitrary functions on encrypted data.. This enables a customer to generate a program that can be executed by a 
third party, without revealing the underlying algorithm or the processed data. We will take the reader through a 
journey of these developments and provide a glimpse of the exciting research directions that lie ahead. In this 
paper,  we  propose  a  selection  of  the  most  important  available  solutions,  discussing  their  properties  and 
limitations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  goal  of  encryption  is  to  ensure 
confidentiality of data in communication and storage 
processes. Recently, its use in constrained devices led 
to consider additional features such as the ability to 
delegate computations to un trusted computers. For 
this  purpose,  we  would  like  to  give  the  un  trusted 
computer  only  an  encrypted  version  of  the  data  to 
process. The computer will perform the computation 
on  this  encrypted  data,  hence  without  knowing 
anything on its real value. Finally, it will send back 
the result, and user will decrypt it. For coherence, the 
decrypted  result  has  to  be  equal  to  the  intended 
computed value if performed on the original data. For 
this reason, the encryption scheme has to present a 
particular structure. Rivest et al. proposed in 1978 to 
solve  this  issuethrough  homomorphic  encryption 
Unfortunately,  Brickell  and  Yacobi  pointed  out  in 
some security flaws in the first proposals of Rivest et 
al  .  Since  this  first  attempt,a  lot  of  articles  have 
proposed solutions dedicated to numerous application 
contexts:  anonymity,  privacy,  electronic  voting, 
electronic auctions, lottery protocols , protection of 
mobile agents , multiparty computation and so forth. 
The  goal  of  this  article  is  to  provide  a  survey  of 
partial and full homomorphic encryption techniques 
 In  Section  2,  we  provide  some  basic  and 
fundamental  information  on  cryptography  and 
various types of encryption schemes. In Section 3, we 
discuss some of basic definitions about homomorphic 
encryption  schemes  in  the  literature.  Section  4 
provides  a  brief  presentation  of  applications  of 
homomorphic  cryptosystems.  Section  5  presents  a 
discussion on partial homomorphic encryption  
 
schemes.  Section  6  presents  a  discussion  on  fully 
homomorphic  encryption  schemes  which  are  the 
most  powerful  encryption  schemes  for  providing  a 
framework  for  computing  over  encrypted  data. 
Finally,  Section  7  concludes  the  chapter  while 
outlining  a  number  of  research  directions  and 
emerging trends in this exciting filed of computation 
which  has  a  tremendous  potential  of  finding 
applications in the real-world deployments. 
 
II.  TOWARDS HOMOMORPHIC 
ENCRYPTION 
A.  Conventional  Cryptography 
In  this  Section,  we  will  recall  some 
important  concepts  on  encryption  schemes. 
Encryption  schemes  are  designed  to  preserve 
confidentiality.  The  security  of  encryption  schemes 
must not rely on the obfuscation of their codes, but it 
should only be based on the secrecy of the key used 
in  the  encryption  process.  Encryption  schemes  are 
broadly of two types 
  symmetric encryption schemes 
  asymmetric encryption schemes 
 
   In  the  following,  we  present  a  very  brief 
discussion on each of these schemes. 
 
1)  Symmetric encryption schemes 
In these schemes, the sender and the receiver 
agree on the key they will use before establishing any 
secure  communication  session.  Therefore,  it  is  not 
possible for two persons who never met before to use 
such schemes directly. This also implies that in order 
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to communicate with different persons, we must have 
a different key for each people. Requirement of large 
number  of  keys  in  these  schemes  make  their  key 
generation and management relatively more complex 
operations. However, symmetric schemes present the 
advantage  of  being  very  fast  and  they  are  used  in 
applications where speed of execution is a paramount 
requirement.  Symmetric-key  encryption  can  use 
either stream ciphers or block ciphers.  
  Stream  ciphers  encrypt  the  digits  (typically 
bytes) of a message one at a time. 
  Block ciphers take a number of bits and encrypt 
them as a single unit, padding the plaintext so 
that it is a multiple of the block size. Blocks of 
64  bits  have  been  commonly  used.  The 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm 
approved by NIST in December 2001 uses 128-
bit blocks. 
Examples  of  popular  and  well-respected 
symmetric  algorithms  Include  Twofish,   Serpent, 
AES (Rijndael), Blowfish, CAST5, RC4, 3DES,  and 
IDEA 
 
2)  Asymmetric encryption schemes: 
In  these  schemes,  every  participant  has  a 
pair of keys private and public. While the private key 
of a person is known to only her, the public key of 
each participant is known to everyone in the group. 
Such schemes are more secure than their symmetric 
counterparts and they don’t need any prior agreement 
between the communicating parties on a common key 
before establishing a session of communication.RSA 
,ElGamal,  Diffie–Hellman  key  exchange protocol, 
DSS (Digital Signature Standard), which incorporates 
the Digital  Signature  Algorithm,  Paillier 
cryptosystem,  Cramer–Shoup  cryptosystem  and 
YAK authenticated key agreement protocol 
 
B.  Security of encryption schemes  
Security  of  encryption  schemes  was  first 
formalized  by  Shannon  with  the  notion  of  perfect 
secrecy/unconditional  secrecy,  which  characterizes 
encryption  schemes  for  which  the  knowledge  of  a 
ciphertext  does  not  give  any  information  about  the 
corresponding plaintext and the encryption key. One-
Time  Pad  encryption  scheme  is  perfectly  secure 
under  certain  conditions.  However,  no  other 
encryption  scheme  has  been  proved  to  be 
unconditionally secure. For asymmetric schemes, we 
can rely on their mathematical structures to estimate 
their  security  strength  in  a  formal  way.  These 
schemes  are  based  on  some  well-identified 
mathematical  problems  which  are  hard  to  solve  in 
general, but easy to solve for the one who knows the 
trapdoor – i.e., the owner of the keys. However, the 
estimation of the security level of these schemes may 
not be always correct due to several reasons. First, 
there  may  be  other  ways  to  break  the  system  than 
solving  the  mathematical  problems  on  which  these 
schemes  are  based.  Second,  most  of  the  security 
proofs  are  performed  in  an  idealized  model  called 
random oracle model, in which involved primitives, 
for  example,  hash  functions,  are  considered  truly 
random.  This  model  has  allowed  the  study  of  the 
security  level  of  numerous  asymmetric  ciphers. 
However,  we  are  now  able  to  perform  proofs  in  a 
more realistic model called standard model (Canetti 
et  al.,  1998;  Paillier,  2007).  This  model  eliminates 
some  of  the  unrealistic  assumptions  in  the  random 
oracle model and makes the 
security  analysis  of  cryptographic  schemes  more 
practical. 
Usually,  to  evaluate  the  attack  capacity  of  an 
adversary, we distinguish among several contexts 
  cipher-text only attacks (where the adversary has 
access only to some ciphertexts) 
  known-plaintext attacks (where the adversary has 
access to some pairs of plaintext messages and 
their corresponding ciphertexts) 
  chosen-plaintext  attacks  (the  adversary  has 
access to a decryption oracle that behaves like a 
black-box and takes a ciphertext as its input and 
outputs the corresponding plaintexts). 
 
C.   Probabilistic encryption:  
Almost  all  the  well-known  cryptosystems 
are  deterministic.  This  means  that  for  a  fixed 
encryption  key,  a  given  plaintext  will  always  be 
encrypted  into  the  same  ciphertext  under  these 
systems.  However,  this  may  lead  to  some  security 
problems.RSA  scheme  is  a  good  example  for 
explaining this point. Let us consider the following 
points with reference to the RSA cryptosystem: 
  A particular plaintext may be encrypted in a too 
much structured way. With RSA,messages 0 and 
1 are always encrypted as 0 and 1, respectively. 
  It  may  be  easy  to  compute  some  partial 
information  about  the  plaintext:  with  RSA,the 
cipher text c leaks one bit of information about 
the  plaintext  m,  namely,  the  so  called  Jacobi 
symbol . 
  When using a deterministic encryption scheme, it 
is easy to detect when the same message is sent 
twice while processed with the same key. 
In  view  of  the  problems  stated  above,  we 
prefer encryption schemes to be probabilistic. In case 
of symmetric schemes, we introduce a random vector 
in the encryption process (e.g., in the pseudo-random 
generator for stream ciphers, or in the operating mode 
for  block  ciphers)  –  generally  called  initial  vector 
(IV).  This  vector  may  be  public  and  it  may  be 
transmitted  in  a  clear-text  form.  However,  the  IV 
must be changed every time we encrypt a message. In 
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more  mathematical  and  formal,  and  we  want  the 
randomized  schemes  to  remain  analyzable  in  the 
same way as the deterministic schemes. Researchers 
have  proposed  some  models  to  randomize  the 
existing  deterministic  schemes,  as  the  optimal 
asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP) for RSA (or 
any  scheme  that  is  based  on  a  trapdoor  one-way 
permutation)  [2]  A  simple  consequence  of  this 
requirement  of  the  encryption  schemes  to  be 
preferably  probabilistic  appears  in  the  phenomenon 
called expansion. Since for a plaintext we require the 
existence of several possible ciphertexts, the number 
of ciphertexts is greater than the number of possible 
plaintexts. This  means the ciphertexts cannot be as 
short as the plaintexts; they have to be strictly longer. 
The  ratio  of  the  length  of  the  ciphertext  and  the 
corresponding plaintext (in bits) is called expansion. 
The  value  of  this  parameter  is  of  paramount 
importance  in  determining  security  and  efficiency 
tradeoff  of  a  probabilistic  encryption  scheme.  In 
Paillier’s  scheme,  an  efficient  probabilistic 
encryption  mechanism  has  been  proposed  with  the 
value of expansion less than 2 . 
 
III. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
SCHEMES 
A.  Homomorphism: 
A  function  f  :  G  −→  H      from  one  group  G  to 
another H  is a (group)  homomorphism if the group 
operation is preserved in the sense that  
 f (g1 ∗G g2) = f (g1) ∗ H  f (g2) 
for all g1, g2 ∈ G. Let eG  be the identity in G and eH  
the identity in H . A group homomorphism f maps eG  
to eH : f (eG) = f (eH ).Note that f must preserve the 
inverse map due to: 
f (g)f (g
−1) = f (gg
−1) = f (eG) , 
 therefore: f (g)
−1  = f (g
−1). 
The kernel of a homomorphism f is 
       ker f = {g ∈ G  :  f (g) = eh} 
The image of f is like the image of any function 
      im f = {h  ∈ H  :  ∃ g ∈ G such that f (g) = h} 
If a group homomorphism f : G → H is subjective, 
then H is said to be a homomorphic image of G. 
 
B.  Homomorphic encryption 
Homomorphic  encryption  is  a  form  of 
encryption  which  allows  specific  types  of 
computations  to  be  carried  out  on  ciphertext  and 
obtain an encrypted result which decrypted matches 
the result of operations performed on the plaintext. 
A public-key encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Enc, 
Dec)  is  homomorphic  if  for  all  k  and  all  (pk,  sk) 
output  from  KeyGen(k),  it  is  possible  to  define 
groups M, C so that:The plaintext space M, and all 
ciphertexts  output  by  Encpk  are  elements  of  C.  For 
any m1, m2 ∈ M and c1, c2 ∈ C with m1 = Decsk (c1) 
and m2 = Decsk (c2) it holds that  
Decsk (c1 ∗ c2) = m1 ∗ m2 
where the group operations ∗ are carried out in C and 
M,  respectively.  In  other  words,  a  homomorphic 
cryptosystem is a PKS with the additional property 
that  there  exists  an  efficient  algorithm  (Eval)  to 
compute  an  encryption  of  the  sum  or/and  the 
product, of two messages given the public key and 
the  encryptions  of  the  messages,  but  not  the 
messages themselves. 
 
C.  Fully homomorphic encryption 
This  scheme  is  able  to  output  a  ciphertext 
that  encrypts  f  (m1,...,  mt),  where  f  is  any  desired 
function,  which  of  course  must  be  efficiently 
computable. No information about m1, ..., mt or f (m1, 
..., mt), or any inter- mediate plaintext values should 
leak. The inputs, outputs and intermediate values are 
always  encrypted  and  therefore  useless  for  an 
adversary.  
A public key encryption scheme (KeyGen, 
Enc, Dec) is fully  homomorphic if there exists an 
additional efficient algorithm Eval that,  for a valid 
public key pk, a permitted circuit  C and a set of 
ciphertexts Ψ = {c1, ..., ct} where 
 ci ← Encpk (mi), outputs c ← Evalpk (C, Ψ)   under 
pk. 
 
IV. APPLICATIONS OF HOMOMORPHIC 
ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
A.  Protection  of mobile  agents 
The  protection  of  mobile  agents  by 
homomorphic encryption can be used in two ways:  
(i)  computing with encrypted functions  
(ii)  computing with encrypted data.  
Computation  with encrypted  functions is a 
special case of protection of mobile agents. In such 
scenarios, a secret function is publicly evaluated in 
such a way that the function remains secret. Using 
homomorphic cryptosystems  the  encrypted function 
can  be  evaluated  which  guarantees  its  privacy. 
Homomorphic schemes also work on encrypted data 
to compute publicly while maintaining the privacy of 
the secret data. This can be done encrypting the data 
in  advance  and  then  exploiting  the  homomorphic 
property to compute with encrypted data. 
 
B.  Multiparty computation 
In multiparty computation schemes, several 
parties are interested in computing a common, public 
function  on  their  inputs  while  keeping  their 
individual inputs private. This problem belongs to the 
area of computing with encrypted data. 
 
C.  Election schemes: S. Sobitha Ahila et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 2( Version 6), February 2014, pp.37-43 
 
 
www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                   40 | P a g e  
 
In  election  schemes,  the  homomorphic 
property provides a tool to obtain the tally given the 
encrypted  votes  without  decrypting  the  individual 
votes. 
 
D.  Mix-nets 
Mix-nets      are  protocols      that  provide   
anonymity  for  senders  by  collecting  encrypted 
messages from several users. A desirable property to 
build  such  mix-nets  is  re-  encryption  which  is 
achieved by using homomorphic encryption. 
 
E.  Data aggregation in wireless sensor networks 
Homomorphic  encryption  schemes  can  be 
applied  to  protect  privacy  of  input  data  while 
computing  an  arbitrary  aggregation  function  in  a 
wireless sensor network 
 
V.  PARTIAL HOMOMORPHIC 
ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
In  this  Section,  we  describe  some 
homomorphic encryption systems which have created 
substantial  interest  among  the  researchers  in  the 
domain of cryptography.  
 
A.  Goldwasser-Micali scheme 
In  Goldwasser-Micali  scheme  as  for  RSA, 
we use computations modulo n = pq, a product of two 
large  primes.  Encryption  is  simple,  with  a  product 
and a square, whereas decryption is heavier, with an 
exponentiation. Nevertheless, this step can be done in 
O(l(p)
2)[10]. The basic principle of GM is to partition 
a well-chosen subset of integers modulo n into two 
secret  parts:  M0  and  M1.Then,  encryption  selects  a 
random element of Mb to encrypt b, and decryption 
allows to know in which part the randomly selected 
element lies. The core point lies in the way to choose 
the subset, and to partition it intoM0 andM1. GM uses 
group theory to achieve the following: the subset is 
the group G of invertible integers modulo n with a 
Jacobi  symbol,  with  respect  to  n,  equal  to  1.  The 
partition  is  generated  by  another  group  H  ⊂    G, 
composed of the elements that are invertible modulo 
n with a Jacobi symbol, with respect to a fixed factor 
of n, equal to 1; with these settings, it is possible to 
split  G  into  two  parts:  H  and    G  \  H  The 
generalizations of Goldwasser-Micali play with these 
two groups; they try to fit two groups G and H such 
that G can be split into more than k = 2 parts.Some 
limitations  are  encrypting  k  bits  leads  to  a  cost  of 
O(k·l(p)
2).  This  is  not  very  efficient  even  if  it  is 
considered  as  practical.  Concerns  about  the 
expansion: a single bit of plaintext is encrypted in an 
integer  modulo  n,  that  is,  l(n)  bits.  Thus,  the 
expansion is really huge.  
 
B.  Benaloh’s scheme 
Benaloh  is  a  generalization  of  GM,  that 
enables  to  manage  inputs  of  l  (k)  bits,  k  being  a 
prime  satisfying  some  particular  constraints. 
Encryption  is  similar  as  in  the  previous  scheme 
(encrypting a message m ∈ {0, ... , k − 1} means 
picking an integer r  ∈   Z∗
 
and computing c = g m rk 
mod  n  but  decryption  is  more  complex.  The  input 
and out- put sizes being, respectively, of l(k) and l(n) 
bits, the expansion is equal to l(n)/l(k)[11]. This is 
better than in the GM case. Moreover, the encryption  
is  not too expensive  as well.  The overhead in the 
decryption process is estimated to be O(√k.l (k))  for 
pre-computation  which  remains  constant  for  each 
dynamic decryption step. But Value of k has to be 
taken  very  small,  which  in  turn  limits  the  gain 
obtained on the value of expansion. 
 
C.  Naccache-Stern scheme 
This  scheme  is  an  improvement  of 
Benaloh’s scheme. Using a value of the parameter k 
that is greater than that used in the Benaloh’s scheme, 
it achieves a smaller expansion and thereby attains a 
superior  efficiency[8].The  encryption  step  is 
precisely the same as in Benaloh’s scheme. However, 
decryption  is  different.  The  value  of  expansion  is 
same as that in Benaloh’s scheme, i.e. 
l (n)/ l (k).However, the cost of ecryption is less and 
is given by: O(l (n)5 log (l (n))  The authors claim 
that  it  is  possible  to  choose  the  values  of  the 
parameters  in  the  system  in  such  a  way  that  the 
achieved value of expansion is 4. 
 
D.  Okamoto-Uchiyama scheme 
Considering n = p2 q, p and q still being two 
large primes, and the group G = Zp ∗ 
2  ,they achieve 
k = p. Thus, the expansion is equal to 3[12].  
 
E.  Paillier scheme 
One of the most well-known homomorphic 
encryption  schemes  is  due  to  Paillier[13].  It  is  an 
improvement of the previous one, that decreases the 
expansion from 3 to 2. Paillier came back to n = pq, 
with gcd (n, φ (n)) = 1, but considered the group G 
= Z ∗ p
2
, and a proper choice of H led him to k = e 
(n). The encryption cost is not too high. Decryption 
needs one exponentiation modulo n2 to the power λ 
(n), and a multiplication modulo n. Paillier showed in 
his  paper  how  to  manage  decryption  efficiently 
through  the  Chinese  Remainder  Theorem.  With 
smaller expansion and lower cost compared with the 
previous  ones,  this  scheme  is  really  attractive.In 
2002,  Cramer  and  Shoup  proposed  a  general 
approach  to  gain  security  against  adaptive  chosen-
ciphertext  attacks  for  certain  cryptosystems  with 
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n 
Paillier’s original scheme, they proposed a stronger 
variant. Bresson et al. proposed in a slightly different 
version  that  may  be  more  accurate  for  some 
applications. 
 
F.  Damgard-Jurik scheme 
Damgard and Jurik propose a generalization 
of Paillier’s scheme to groups of the form Z
•n s+l for 
s > 0. In this scheme, choice of larger values of s will 
achieve lower values of expansion [14]. This scheme 
can  be  used  in  a  number  of  applications.  For 
example, we can mention the adaptation of the size of 
the  plaintext,  the  use  of  threshold  cryptography, 
electronic voting, and so on. To encrypt a message, m 
∈ Z n one picks r ∈ Z
∗ n at random and computes 
g
mrns  ∈  Zns+1.  The  authors  show  that  if  one  can 
break the scheme for a given value s = σ, then one 
can break it for s = σ − 1. They also show that the 
semantic security of this scheme is equivalent to that 
of Paillier. To summarize, the expansion is of 1 + 1/s, 
and hence can be close to 1 if s is sufficiently large. 
The ratio of the encryption cost of this scheme over 
Paillier’s can be estimated to be (1/6)s(s + 1)(s + 2). 
The same ratio for the decryption step equals (1/6)(s 
+ 1)(s + 2).Note that even if this scheme is better than 
Paillier’s according to its lower expansion, it remains 
more  costly.  Moreover,  if  we  want  to  encrypt  or 
decrypt  k  blocks  of  l  (n)  bits,  running  Paillier’s 
scheme k times is less costly than running Damgard-
Jurik’s scheme once. 
 
G.  Galbraith scheme 
This  is  an  adaptation  of  the  existing 
homomorphic encryption schemes in the context of 
elliptic curves [15]. Its expansion is equal to 3. For s 
= l the ratio of the encryption cost for this scheme 
over that of Paillier’s scheme can be estimated to be 
about  7,  while  the  same  ratio  for  the  cost  of 
decryption cost is about 14 for the same value of s. 
However,  the  most  important  advantage  of  this 
scheme is that the cost of encryption and decryption 
can be decreased using larger values of s. In addition, 
the security of the scheme increases with the increase 
in the value of s as it is the case in Damgard-Jurik’s  
 
H.  Castagnos scheme 
Castagnos  explored  the  possibility  of 
improving  the  performance  of  homomorphic 
encryption schemes using quadratic fields quotations 
[16]. This scheme achieves an expansion value of 3 
and the ratio of encryption/decryption cost with s = l 
over Paillier’s scheme can be estimated to be about 2. 
 
VI. FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
SCHEMES 
A.  Gentry’s scheme  
He proposed fully homomorphic  encryption  
consists  of  several  steps: It constructs a somewhat  
homomorphic    scheme  that    supports    evaluating  
low-degree  polynomials  on  the encrypted data. It 
squashes  the decryption  procedure  so that  it can be 
expressed  as a low-degree   polynomial   which  is  
supported    by    the    scheme  It  applies    a 
bootstrapping  transformation  to  obtain  a  fully 
homomorphic scheme[6].  
 
B.  Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan, Scheme 
 
They  have  constructed  a  somewhat  homomorphic 
encryption  scheme  based  on  RLWE[1,3,4].  The 
scheme inherits  the simplicity  and efficiency,  as 
well    as  the  worst    case  relation    to  ideal  lattices.  
Moreover,  the  scheme  enjoys  key    dependent  
message  security  (KDM  security,  also known  as 
circular  security),  since   it can  securely  encrypt  
polynomial functions  (over an appropriately  defined  
ring) of its  own  secret key. The authors argue that 
all  known  constructions  of  fully  homomorphic 
encryption  employ  a  bootstrapping  technique  that 
enforces  the  public  key  of  the  scheme  to  grow 
linearly with the maximal depth of evaluated circuits. 
This is a major drawback with regard to the usability 
and  the efficiency  of  the schemes. However,  the 
size  of  the public key  can be made independent  of  
the  circuit  depth  if the  somewhat homomorphic  
scheme can securely encrypt its own secret key[9]. 
With  the  design  of  this  scheme,  the  authors  have 
solved an open problem - achieving circular secure 
somewhat  homomorphic  encryption.  The  authors 
have also shown  how  to  transform  the  proposed  
scheme  into    a    fully  homomorphic  encryption 
scheme  following  Gentry’s  blueprint  of  squashing 
and bootstrapping. 
 
C.  Smart and Vercauteren scheme 
They  present  a  fully  homomorphic 
encryption  scheme  has  smaller  key  and  ciphertext 
sizes [17]. The construction proposed by the authors 
follows the fully homomorphic construction based on 
ideal lattices proposed by Gentry. It produces a fully 
homomorphic  scheme  form  a  somewhat 
homomorphic scheme. For somewhat homomorphic 
scheme,  the  public  and  the  private  keys  consist  of 
two large integers (one of which shared by both the 
public  and  the  private  key),  and  the  ciphertext 
consists of one large integer.  
 
D.  Gentry and Halev scheme 
They  presented  a  novel  implementation 
approach  for  the  variant  of  Smart  and  Vercauteren 
proposition  which  had  a  greatly  improved  key 
generation  phase.  In  particular,  the  authors  have 
noted that key generation (for cyclotomic fields) is S. Sobitha Ahila et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                www.ijera.com 
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essentially  an  application  of  a  Discrete  Fourier 
Transform (DFT), followed  by a small  quantum of 
computation,  and  then  application  of  the  inverse 
transform. The key generation method of Gentry and 
Halevi is fast [7]. 
 
E.  Stehle and Steinfield scheme  
They improved Gentry’s fully homomorphic 
scheme  and  obtained  a  faster  fully  homomorphic 
scheme with O(n3.5) bits complexity per elementary 
binary  addition/multiplication  gate  However,  the 
hardness assumption of the security of the scheme is 
stronger than that of Gentry’s scheme. The improved  
complexity  of the proposed scheme stems from two 
sources[18].  First,  the  authors  have  given  a  more 
aggressive security analysis of the sparse subset sum 
problem (SSSP) against lattice attacks as compared to 
the analysis presented in (Gentry, 2009). The SSSP 
along  with  the  ideal  lattice  bounded  distance 
decoding  (BDD)  problem  are  the  two  problems 
underlying  the  security  of  Gentry’s  fully 
homomorphic  scheme.  On  the  contrary,  the  finer 
analysis of Stehle and Steinfield for SSSP takes into 
account the complexity of approximate SVP, thereby 
making  it  more  consistent  with  the  assumption 
underlying the analysis of the BDD problem.  
 
F.  Chunsheng scheme 
Chunsheng proposed a  modification of the 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme of Smart and 
Vercauteren.  The  author  has  applied  a  self-loop 
bootstrappable technique[19] so that the security of 
the modified scheme only depends  on  the  hardness 
of  the  polynomial  coset  problem  and  does not  
require    any  assumption    of    the  sparse    subset  
problem.In  addition,  the  author  have  constructed  a 
non- self-loop fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
that uses cycle keys. In a nutshell, the security of the 
improved fully homomorphic encryption  scheme in 
this  work  is  based  on  use  of  three  mathematical 
approaches: (i) hardness of factoring integer problem, 
(ii) solving Diophantine equation problem, and (iii) 
finding  approximate  greatest  common  divisor 
problem. 
 
G.  Boneh & Freeman scheme 
Boneh  and  Freeman  propose  a  linearly 
homomorphic  signature  scheme  that  authenticates 
vector subspaces of a given ambient space [20]. The 
scheme  has  several  novel  features  that  were  not 
present in any of the existing similar schemes. First, 
the  scheme  is  the  first  of  its  kind  that  enables 
authentication of vectors over binary fields; previous 
schemes could not authenticate vectors with large or 
growing coefficients. Second, the scheme is the only 
scheme that is based on the problem of finding short 
vectors in integer lattices, and therefore, it enjoys the 
worst-case  security  guarantee  that  is  common  to 
lattice-based cryptosystems. The scheme can be used 
to authenticate linear transformations of signed data, 
such  as  those  arising  when  computing  mean  and 
Fourier  transform  or  in  networks  that  use  network 
coding.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 We presented in this paper a state of the art 
on homomorphic encryption schemes discussing their 
parameters, performances and security issues. As we 
saw, these schemes are not well suited for every use, 
and their characteristics must be taken into account. 
Nowadays,  such  schemes  are  studied  in  wide 
application  contexts,  but  the  research  is  still 
challenging in the cryptographic community to design 
more  powerful  secure  schemes.  Performing 
computations  using  fully  homomorphic  encryption 
scheme  nowadays  takes  quite  a  long  time,  but  as 
techniques  evolve  things  will  quickly  change. 
Researchers believe in the possibility of advancing in 
fully homomorphic encryption area and bringing new 
related technologies to the wide market. It can be used 
whenever the need of doing computations on pieces of 
un-owned information appears.We therefore conclude 
that focusing on these topics would be a good idea for 
further research. 
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